Alexei Navalny was killed by Vladimir Putin on February 16, 2024, in a penal colony above the Arctic Circle. In response to this crime, FBK has put together <a href="https://acf.international/materials">proposals for sanctions</a> targeting Putin&rsquo;s inner circle, oligarchs close to him, and regime accomplices. These recommendations are aimed at the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union, as they are actively imposing personal sanctions. We&rsquo;ve prepared separate lists for each country, focusing on individuals whose sanctions would directly impact Putin and the system of power he has created.&nbsp;

Putin&rsquo;s regime is built on personal connections. Even during wartime, it functions to enrich the dictator and those close to him. Our lists include key figures in Putin&rsquo;s inner circle&mdash;people who are important to him or crucial to his regime. These individuals are deeply embedded in Russia&rsquo;s power structure, involved in corruption, and actively working to keep the war going. Sanctioning them would be far more effective than targeting low-level perpetrators of the crime, whose fate means little to Putin.&nbsp;

Each of the Navalny Lists names 50 people who have yet to face sanctions in the respective jurisdiction. We have refined the lists to clarify the wording that explains each person&rsquo;s importance to Putin or his regime. We&rsquo;ve also highlighted recent changes in top government positions, where many on the list have taken on even more influential roles. These lists also consider the specific nuances of different sanctions regimes. All the information is based on public sources, including investigations and media publications.

There is no single response to the political assassination of Alexei Navalny&mdash;nor should there be. There must be many responses, targeting Russia&rsquo;s authoritarian regime, the war it has waged, and its repression. Our three lists offer another tool to ensure that the dictator doesn&rsquo;t escape consequences of his blatant crime. We hope the international community will use this tool to hold Putin accountable for his actions.&nbsp;

Alexei Navalny was killed by Vladimir Putin on February 16, 2024, in a penal colony above the Arctic Circle. In response to this crime, FBK has put together <a href="https://acf.international/materials" target="_blank">proposals for sanctions</a> targeting Putin’s inner circle, oligarchs close to him, and regime accomplices. These recommendations are aimed at the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union, as they are actively imposing personal sanctions. We’ve prepared separate lists for each country, focusing on individuals whose sanctions would directly impact Putin and the system of power he has created.

Putin’s regime is built on personal connections. Even during wartime, it functions to enrich the dictator and those close to him. Our lists include key figures in Putin’s inner circle—people who are important to him or crucial to his regime. These individuals are deeply embedded in Russia’s power structure, involved in corruption, and actively working to keep the war going. Sanctioning them would be far more effective than targeting low-level perpetrators of the crime, whose fate means little to Putin. 

Each of the Navalny Lists names 50 people who have yet to face sanctions in the respective jurisdiction. We have refined the lists to clarify the wording that explains each person’s importance to Putin or his regime. We’ve also highlighted recent changes in top government positions, where many on the list have taken on even more influential roles. These lists also consider the specific nuances of different sanctions regimes. All the information is based on public sources, including investigations and media publications.

There is no single response to the political assassination of Alexei Navalny—nor should there be. There must be many responses, targeting Russia’s authoritarian regime, the war it has waged, and its repression. Our three lists offer another tool to ensure that the dictator doesn’t escape consequences of his blatant crime. We hope the international community will use this tool to hold Putin accountable for his actions. 

We’ve updated our sanctions proposals in response to the murder of Alexei Navalny. They are now available again on the FBK website.

"Navalny Lists" Have Been Updated

Julia Navalnaya has been awarded the Vanguardia International Award. The award was <a href="https://t.me/news_sirena/32626">presented</a> to her by the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro S&aacute;nchez. The ceremony took place in Barcelona and was also attended by the second Deputy Prime Minister of Spain, Yolanda D&iacute;az, and the head of Catalonia, Salvador Illa.

<img alt="" src="/media/news/2024/10/01/photo_2024-10-01_13-46-22.jpg" style="width: 1280px; height: 681px;" />

The award was organized by La Vanguardia, the largest newspaper in Catalonia and one of the most widely read newspapers in Spain. In addition to Navalnaya, six other individuals received awards in the categories of &quot;Sustainable Development,&quot; &quot;Entrepreneur of the Year,&quot; &quot;Innovation and Science,&quot; &quot;Urban Development,&quot; &quot;Culture,&quot; and &quot;In Memory.&quot;

&nbsp;

Julia Navalnaya has been awarded the Vanguardia International Award. The award was <a href="https://t.me/news_sirena/32626" target="_blank">presented</a> to her by the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sánchez. The ceremony took place in Barcelona and was also attended by the second Deputy Prime Minister of Spain, Yolanda Díaz, and the head of Catalonia, Salvador Illa.

The award was organized by La Vanguardia, the largest newspaper in Catalonia and one of the most widely read newspapers in Spain. In addition to Navalnaya, six other individuals received awards in the categories of "Sustainable Development," "Entrepreneur of the Year," "Innovation and Science," "Urban Development," "Culture," and "In Memory."

The award was presented to Yulia Navalnaya by the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sánchez.

Navalnaya Receives Vanguardia International Award

According to the <a href="https://navalny.com/p/6677/">investigation</a>, Nevzlin orchestrated the March 2024 assault on Volkov with the intention of having him beaten &quot;into a wheelchair,&quot; then smuggled into Russia and handed over to the FSB. Nevzlin is also implicated in the attacks on FBK director Ivan Zhdanov in Geneva and on Alexandra Petrachkova, the wife of economist Maxim Mironov, in Argentina.

<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="360" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/7JvLMy4o51M" width="640"></iframe>

The investigation is based on messages and recordings of conversations with Nevzlin, provided to ACF by Andrei Matus, whom Nevzlin had hired to destroy the correspondence. ACF sought independent verification from investigators Christo Grozev and Project journalist Mikhail Maglov. They reviewed the correspondence, cross-referenced it with public information, and confirmed its authenticity.&nbsp;

The messages reveal that lawyer Anatoly Blinov was tasked with organizing the attack. Initially, the plan was to kidnap Volkov in Lithuania, take him to Russia, and hand him over to the FSB. However, the plan shifted, and they decided to beat Volkov &quot;into a wheelchair.&quot;

On March 12, Volkov was attacked near his home in Vilnius. An unknown assailant sprayed tear gas in his face and began striking him with a hammer. Volkov was hospitalized with a broken arm and several leg injuries.

Nevzlin was supposed to pay $250,000 for the attack, with $150,000 going to the perpetrators. However, he was dissatisfied with the extent of Volkov&rsquo;s injuries and refused to pay. As a result, Nevzlin instructed Matus to confiscate the phones used by Blinov and his team to coordinate the attack. Matus followed this order, but handed the information from these devices over to ACF.

ACF has contacted law enforcement agencies in the countries where Nevzlin resides. We are prepared to provide all evidence and testify in court. Leonid Nevzlin must be arrested and brought to trial for orchestrating the kidnapping and attempted murder of Leonid Volkov, as well as for the attacks on Petrachkova and Zhdanov.

According to the <a href="https://navalny.com/p/6677/" target="_blank">investigation</a>, Nevzlin orchestrated the March 2024 assault on Volkov with the intention of having him beaten "into a wheelchair," then smuggled into Russia and handed over to the FSB. Nevzlin is also implicated in the attacks on FBK director Ivan Zhdanov in Geneva and on Alexandra Petrachkova, the wife of economist Maxim Mironov, in Argentina.

The investigation is based on messages and recordings of conversations with Nevzlin, provided to ACF by Andrei Matus, whom Nevzlin had hired to destroy the correspondence. ACF sought independent verification from investigators Christo Grozev and Project journalist Mikhail Maglov. They reviewed the correspondence, cross-referenced it with public information, and confirmed its authenticity. 

The messages reveal that lawyer Anatoly Blinov was tasked with organizing the attack. Initially, the plan was to kidnap Volkov in Lithuania, take him to Russia, and hand him over to the FSB. However, the plan shifted, and they decided to beat Volkov "into a wheelchair."

On March 12, Volkov was attacked near his home in Vilnius. An unknown assailant sprayed tear gas in his face and began striking him with a hammer. Volkov was hospitalized with a broken arm and several leg injuries.

Nevzlin was supposed to pay $250,000 for the attack, with $150,000 going to the perpetrators. However, he was dissatisfied with the extent of Volkov’s injuries and refused to pay. As a result, Nevzlin instructed Matus to confiscate the phones used by Blinov and his team to coordinate the attack. Matus followed this order, but handed the information from these devices over to ACF.

ACF has contacted law enforcement agencies in the countries where Nevzlin resides. We are prepared to provide all evidence and testify in court. Leonid Nevzlin must be arrested and brought to trial for orchestrating the kidnapping and attempted murder of Leonid Volkov, as well as for the attacks on Petrachkova and Zhdanov.

An ACF investigation has revealed that former Yukos executive Leonid Nevzlin was behind the attack on Leonid Volkov.

Oligarch Leonid Nevzlin Ordered the Attack on Leonid Volkov – ACF Investigation

The ACF developed and submitted recommendations to the Australian Parliament on how to improve the country&rsquo;s sanctions legislation. The Parliament <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Sanctions47">requested</a> such proposals as part of its own research.

Australia plays a crucial role in international politics as a major nation defending the values of the free world and as a member of the Commonwealth. The sanctions Australia imposes often pave the way for similar measures in other countries, like the United Kingdom and Canada.

In our recommendations to Australia, we focused on the aspect of sanctions we know best&mdash;targeted sanctions against enablers of corrupt authoritarian regimes, such as Vladimir Putin&rsquo;s regime. The nature of authoritarianism is strikingly similar worldwide, and the methods of combating it are universally applicable.

We propose that sanctions be imposed on individuals based on their roles within these regimes. Taking on a position within a regime should automatically trigger sanctions. If you choose to work for such a regime, you need to know that this decision will close off much of the world&mdash;and access to your ill-gotten gains. This approach sends a clear message to anyone considering working for these regimes: you are complicit in crimes, and the consequences are inevitable. At the same time, this method simplifies the enforcement and management of sanctions.

We also recommend imposing sanctions for &quot;serious corruption&quot; (a term already used in Australian law) against oligarchs and elites within authoritarian regimes. Corruption is the foundation and a key tool for solidifying these regimes. In such systems, corruption is a reward for loyalty among the elites. Sanctions against corrupt individuals, therefore, strike at the heart of these regimes. After all, corrupt wealth loses its luster when it can&rsquo;t be moved to places where the rule of law protects property and guarantees human rights.

Finally, we propose requiring sanctioned individuals to declare their assets. Those who comply would face the current consequences: their funds and property would be frozen until the sanctions are lifted. However, those who hide their assets could face fines equal to the value of the concealed property, effectively leading to asset confiscation. This would make hiding assets less appealing, reduce disputes over ownership, and create strong incentives to uncover hidden assets.

We hope that if our proposals are adopted, they will help exert more effective pressure on authoritarian regimes around the world.

The ACF developed and submitted recommendations to the Australian Parliament on how to improve the country’s sanctions legislation. The Parliament <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Sanctions47" target="_blank">requested</a> such proposals as part of its own research.

Australia plays a crucial role in international politics as a major nation defending the values of the free world and as a member of the Commonwealth. The sanctions Australia imposes often pave the way for similar measures in other countries, like the United Kingdom and Canada.

In our recommendations to Australia, we focused on the aspect of sanctions we know best—targeted sanctions against enablers of corrupt authoritarian regimes, such as Vladimir Putin’s regime. The nature of authoritarianism is strikingly similar worldwide, and the methods of combating it are universally applicable.

We propose that sanctions be imposed on individuals based on their roles within these regimes. Taking on a position within a regime should automatically trigger sanctions. If you choose to work for such a regime, you need to know that this decision will close off much of the world—and access to your ill-gotten gains. This approach sends a clear message to anyone considering working for these regimes: you are complicit in crimes, and the consequences are inevitable. At the same time, this method simplifies the enforcement and management of sanctions.

We also recommend imposing sanctions for "serious corruption" (a term already used in Australian law) against oligarchs and elites within authoritarian regimes. Corruption is the foundation and a key tool for solidifying these regimes. In such systems, corruption is a reward for loyalty among the elites. Sanctions against corrupt individuals, therefore, strike at the heart of these regimes. After all, corrupt wealth loses its luster when it can’t be moved to places where the rule of law protects property and guarantees human rights.

Finally, we propose requiring sanctioned individuals to declare their assets. Those who comply would face the current consequences: their funds and property would be frozen until the sanctions are lifted. However, those who hide their assets could face fines equal to the value of the concealed property, effectively leading to asset confiscation. This would make hiding assets less appealing, reduce disputes over ownership, and create strong incentives to uncover hidden assets.

We hope that if our proposals are adopted, they will help exert more effective pressure on authoritarian regimes around the world.

Our focus was on the type of sanctions we know best—targeted sanctions against those who support corrupt authoritarian regimes.

The Anti-Corruption Foundation Has Submitted Proposals to the Australian Parliament Regarding Sanctions Policy

Dear Mrs. Fajon, dear ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for inviting me to speak at the Bled Strategic Forum and for the award you have chosen to give me. It is a great honor. But even more importantly, it is a fantastic opportunity to address such a distinguished audience&mdash;a great chance to deliver my speech to a large group of people who are at the heart of strategic decision-making.

The events of the last few years have been unfolding at an alarming pace, and the world around us is changing so rapidly that you are constantly having to make numerous tactical decisions. You are here in this hall because you excel at this; you are the best in your countries at handling these challenges. Your voters have entrusted you with managing the never-ending challenges of today&rsquo;s world: wars, epidemics, climate issues, the economy, and migration.

However, I would like to talk not about tactics, but about strategy&mdash;especially since we are gathered here today at a strategic forum. And, of course, as a politician and a citizen of Russia, I want to talk about Russia.

Alexei, my husband, who was killed by Putin six months ago, often used to say, &quot;Never lose sight of the bigger picture.&quot; He had a unique ability to see the bigger picture, to create a vision for the future many years ahead, and to present it in a way that was understandable to everyone, inspiring others with this idea. Thus, his vision of &quot;The Beautiful Russia of the Future&quot; was born&mdash;a democratic, peaceful, European country that will, without doubt, succeed Putin&#39;s regime.

But how do we get to this future? Where will it come from? I&rsquo;d like to ask you a simple question: What is the European Union&#39;s strategy for Russia? Not its current set of measures&mdash;sanctions, restrictions, regulations, etc.&mdash;but its strategy. How does it sound? Is it short, clear, and future-oriented? Can it be defined in three or four sentences? It seems to me that such a strategy does not currently exist. I believe this is a major problem.

There is a certain line of action, for example, regarding the imposition of sanctions. Governments of different countries impose various sanctions on Russia&mdash;both personal and sectoral, as well as against ordinary citizens. At the same time, no one has a clear understanding of why they are being imposed, what their ultimate goal is, or how they affect the speed at which Putin&rsquo;s regime will collapse. Indeed, how can anyone understand this if there is no big picture to measure it against? Without a strategy, it&rsquo;s impossible to make sensible tactical decisions. A strategy provides the framework needed to evaluate the effectiveness of each current decision.

For example, consider Europe&rsquo;s commitment to green energy. This strategic decision was made quite some time ago. Obviously, there are tactical disagreements among the 27 countries, which is perfectly normal and unavoidable. However, despite these disagreements, no one questions the fundamental principles of the strategy. No one suggests demolishing all the wind turbines and returning to coal and fuel oil. European countries are each pursuing green energy at their own pace and in their own way, but they are all moving in the same direction within the framework of the overall strategy.

So, what about the debates on Russia? We can easily find those who openly argue that we should give Putin everything he wants, make peace on his terms, and return to &quot;business as usual,&quot; including buying oil and gas. However, no one can explain why Putin would stand by any agreements or what to do when he ignores them and resumes the war after taking a break.

We can also easily find those who claim that all Russians truly support Putin. But they can&rsquo;t explain why the number of political prisoners in Russia is rising daily or why the number of Russian emigrants abroad continues to increase. And none of them talk about how to support those Russians who oppose the war or how to win over the doubters.

Finally, there are those who advocate for the urgent &quot;decolonization&quot; of Russia, arguing to split our vast country into several smaller, safer states. However, these &ldquo;decolonizers&rdquo; can&rsquo;t explain why people with shared backgrounds and culture should be artificially divided. Nor do they say how this process should even take place.

We see a wide range of opinions, but we don&rsquo;t see a strategy. Of course, it&#39;s very difficult to reach a compromise from such diverse positions. But reaching a compromise is the job of politicians.

No matter what Europe&#39;s future holds, Russia will be part of it. No matter what Russia&#39;s future holds, it will be linked to Europe&#39;s future.&nbsp;

We can&#39;t close our eyes and make Russia disappear&mdash;fortunately. We can&rsquo;t close our eyes and make Putin&rsquo;s regime disappear&mdash;unfortunately. So, we need to develop a plan and follow it accordingly.

And, of course, a strategy for Russia cannot be developed without Russia. It must include the part of Russian civil society that opposes Putin&mdash;Russians who have been working on the basis of democratic, European principles throughout Putin&#39;s rule. Russians who protest against the war, who fight against Putin&rsquo;s dictatorship, risking their freedom and their lives.

In recent months, I&rsquo;ve had many meetings with a wide range of high-level politicians. At every meeting, I am asked, &quot;How can we help?&quot; Well, here&rsquo;s my answer: Let&#39;s work together to develop a strategy and start implementing it.

If you ask me how it might sound, here is my answer: Russia can and should become a democratic European country within its internationally recognized borders. This won&#39;t happen while power is usurped by Putin and his criminal regime. So, together with Russian civil society, we will fight to remove this obstacle to peace and freedom.

Sounds simple, doesn&rsquo;t it? Well, a strategy shouldn&rsquo;t sound complicated. It should be clear. It should provide clarity on what to do and what not to do:

&mdash; Support Russian civil society, Russian independent media, Russian human rights defenders, and any Russian horizontal structures? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

&mdash; Support those who promote hatred of Russians? No, that doesn&rsquo;t align with the strategy.

&mdash; Make a distinction between Putin and Russia? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

&mdash; Negotiate with Putin as if he were a legitimate, democratically elected president of Russia? No, that doesn&rsquo;t align with the strategy.

&mdash; Support Ukraine in exercising its right to defend itself? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

&mdash; Threaten to divide Russia into many parts, playing into the hands of Putin&#39;s propaganda? No, that doesn&rsquo;t align with the strategy.

We need to find a compromise on an important issue: What kind of Russia do we want to see after Putin? Once we agree on this, it will be easier to make tactical decisions. Each decision will be more effective, and the future we are working towards will arrive much sooner.

Let&rsquo;s do this together.

Thank you!

&nbsp;

Dear Mrs. Fajon, dear ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for inviting me to speak at the Bled Strategic Forum and for the award you have chosen to give me. It is a great honor. But even more importantly, it is a fantastic opportunity to address such a distinguished audience—a great chance to deliver my speech to a large group of people who are at the heart of strategic decision-making.

The events of the last few years have been unfolding at an alarming pace, and the world around us is changing so rapidly that you are constantly having to make numerous tactical decisions. You are here in this hall because you excel at this; you are the best in your countries at handling these challenges. Your voters have entrusted you with managing the never-ending challenges of today’s world: wars, epidemics, climate issues, the economy, and migration.

However, I would like to talk not about tactics, but about strategy—especially since we are gathered here today at a strategic forum. And, of course, as a politician and a citizen of Russia, I want to talk about Russia.

Alexei, my husband, who was killed by Putin six months ago, often used to say, "Never lose sight of the bigger picture." He had a unique ability to see the bigger picture, to create a vision for the future many years ahead, and to present it in a way that was understandable to everyone, inspiring others with this idea. Thus, his vision of "The Beautiful Russia of the Future" was born—a democratic, peaceful, European country that will, without doubt, succeed Putin's regime.

But how do we get to this future? Where will it come from? I’d like to ask you a simple question: What is the European Union's strategy for Russia? Not its current set of measures—sanctions, restrictions, regulations, etc.—but its strategy. How does it sound? Is it short, clear, and future-oriented? Can it be defined in three or four sentences? It seems to me that such a strategy does not currently exist. I believe this is a major problem.

There is a certain line of action, for example, regarding the imposition of sanctions. Governments of different countries impose various sanctions on Russia—both personal and sectoral, as well as against ordinary citizens. At the same time, no one has a clear understanding of why they are being imposed, what their ultimate goal is, or how they affect the speed at which Putin’s regime will collapse. Indeed, how can anyone understand this if there is no big picture to measure it against? Without a strategy, it’s impossible to make sensible tactical decisions. A strategy provides the framework needed to evaluate the effectiveness of each current decision.

For example, consider Europe’s commitment to green energy. This strategic decision was made quite some time ago. Obviously, there are tactical disagreements among the 27 countries, which is perfectly normal and unavoidable. However, despite these disagreements, no one questions the fundamental principles of the strategy. No one suggests demolishing all the wind turbines and returning to coal and fuel oil. European countries are each pursuing green energy at their own pace and in their own way, but they are all moving in the same direction within the framework of the overall strategy.

So, what about the debates on Russia? We can easily find those who openly argue that we should give Putin everything he wants, make peace on his terms, and return to "business as usual," including buying oil and gas. However, no one can explain why Putin would stand by any agreements or what to do when he ignores them and resumes the war after taking a break.

We can also easily find those who claim that all Russians truly support Putin. But they can’t explain why the number of political prisoners in Russia is rising daily or why the number of Russian emigrants abroad continues to increase. And none of them talk about how to support those Russians who oppose the war or how to win over the doubters.

Finally, there are those who advocate for the urgent "decolonization" of Russia, arguing to split our vast country into several smaller, safer states. However, these “decolonizers” can’t explain why people with shared backgrounds and culture should be artificially divided. Nor do they say how this process should even take place.

We see a wide range of opinions, but we don’t see a strategy. Of course, it's very difficult to reach a compromise from such diverse positions. But reaching a compromise is the job of politicians.

No matter what Europe's future holds, Russia will be part of it. No matter what Russia's future holds, it will be linked to Europe's future. 

We can't close our eyes and make Russia disappear—fortunately. We can’t close our eyes and make Putin’s regime disappear—unfortunately. So, we need to develop a plan and follow it accordingly.

And, of course, a strategy for Russia cannot be developed without Russia. It must include the part of Russian civil society that opposes Putin—Russians who have been working on the basis of democratic, European principles throughout Putin's rule. Russians who protest against the war, who fight against Putin’s dictatorship, risking their freedom and their lives.

In recent months, I’ve had many meetings with a wide range of high-level politicians. At every meeting, I am asked, "How can we help?" Well, here’s my answer: Let's work together to develop a strategy and start implementing it.

If you ask me how it might sound, here is my answer: Russia can and should become a democratic European country within its internationally recognized borders. This won't happen while power is usurped by Putin and his criminal regime. So, together with Russian civil society, we will fight to remove this obstacle to peace and freedom.

Sounds simple, doesn’t it? Well, a strategy shouldn’t sound complicated. It should be clear. It should provide clarity on what to do and what not to do:

— Support Russian civil society, Russian independent media, Russian human rights defenders, and any Russian horizontal structures? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

— Support those who promote hatred of Russians? No, that doesn’t align with the strategy.

— Make a distinction between Putin and Russia? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

— Negotiate with Putin as if he were a legitimate, democratically elected president of Russia? No, that doesn’t align with the strategy.

— Support Ukraine in exercising its right to defend itself? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

— Threaten to divide Russia into many parts, playing into the hands of Putin's propaganda? No, that doesn’t align with the strategy.

We need to find a compromise on an important issue: What kind of Russia do we want to see after Putin? Once we agree on this, it will be easier to make tactical decisions. Each decision will be more effective, and the future we are working towards will arrive much sooner.

Navalnaya called on European countries to develop a unified strategy to oppose Putin and his regime.

Yulia Navalnaya delivered a speech at a strategic forum in Slovenia

The Anti-Corruption Foundation has prepared lists of individuals who should be sanctioned in response to the murder of Alexei Navalny. These &quot;Navalny Lists 50&quot; have been sent to the U.S. Department of State, the UK Foreign Office, and relevant ministries in several European countries.

The lists include the names of those valuable to Vladimir Putin and essential to his criminal regime. Sanctions against them will pay tribute to Alexei Navalny&#39;s fight against the corruption that gave rise to this regime.

We have included three categories in the lists: people from Vladimir Putin&#39;s closest circle, whose fate concerns the dictator, such as his relatives and asset holders; oligarchs who ensure a luxurious lifestyle for Putin&#39;s closest associates; and subjects of Alexei Navalny&#39;s anti-corruption investigations.

All of these individuals are crucial parts of Putin&#39;s regime, and imposing sanctions on them will pay tribute to Russia&#39;s foremost anti-corruption fighter.

<a href="https://acf.international/materials">Here</a> you can view the lists for the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

And <a href="https://acf.international/media/Letter_in_support_of_Navalny_List_50.pdf">here</a> is a template that you can send to your country&#39;s foreign ministry and national or European parliament members. Mass citizen appeals will expedite the review of the lists.

&nbsp;

The Anti-Corruption Foundation has prepared lists of individuals who should be sanctioned in response to the murder of Alexei Navalny. These "Navalny Lists 50" have been sent to the U.S. Department of State, the UK Foreign Office, and relevant ministries in several European countries.

The lists include the names of those valuable to Vladimir Putin and essential to his criminal regime. Sanctions against them will pay tribute to Alexei Navalny's fight against the corruption that gave rise to this regime.

We have included three categories in the lists: people from Vladimir Putin's closest circle, whose fate concerns the dictator, such as his relatives and asset holders; oligarchs who ensure a luxurious lifestyle for Putin's closest associates; and subjects of Alexei Navalny's anti-corruption investigations.

All of these individuals are crucial parts of Putin's regime, and imposing sanctions on them will pay tribute to Russia's foremost anti-corruption fighter.

<a href="https://acf.international/materials" target="_blank">Here</a> you can view the lists for the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

And <a href="https://acf.international/media/Letter_in_support_of_Navalny_List_50.pdf" target="_blank">here</a> is a template that you can send to your country's foreign ministry and national or European parliament members. Mass citizen appeals will expedite the review of the lists.

We demand that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union impose sanctions on Putin's inner circle, oligarchs, and corrupt officials in response to the murder of Alexei Navalny.

Sanctions Response to the Murder of Alexei Navalny

This week&#39;s update of the 6000 list reflects the reshuffles that have already taken place in the Russian Government. This has entailed resignations among governors, some of whom have moved to new positions at the federal level. Their places as heads of regions have been taken by new people.&nbsp;

The update also reflects changes in the structures of the Ministry of Defence. Several more high-ranking military commanders have left their posts due to the ongoing arrests on corruption charges of the subjects of our investigations and other officials. In addition, we have updated data on the regional heads of the security agencies that guard the regime: Investigative Committee officials, prosecutors, and the heads of regional FSB and Rosgvardia directorates.

If you have information about inaccuracies in our &lsquo;6000 list&rsquo; or believe someone is or is not included there in error, email us at <a href="mailto:info@acf.international">info@acf.international</a>.

Any changes that have been made to the 6,000 List since the last update can be viewed <a href="https://acf.international/media/Changes_from_24.05.2024.pdf">here</a>. We would also like to remind you that searching the list has become even more convenient with the <a href="https://sanctions.acf.international/">&quot;Sanctions Tracker&quot;</a> service.

&nbsp;

This week's update of the 6000 list reflects the reshuffles that have already taken place in the Russian Government. This has entailed resignations among governors, some of whom have moved to new positions at the federal level. Their places as heads of regions have been taken by new people. 

The update also reflects changes in the structures of the Ministry of Defence. Several more high-ranking military commanders have left their posts due to the ongoing arrests on corruption charges of the subjects of our investigations and other officials. In addition, we have updated data on the regional heads of the security agencies that guard the regime: Investigative Committee officials, prosecutors, and the heads of regional FSB and Rosgvardia directorates.

If you have information about inaccuracies in our ‘6000 list’ or believe someone is or is not included there in error, email us at <a href="mailto:info@acf.international" target="_blank">info@acf.international</a>.

Any changes that have been made to the 6,000 List since the last update can be viewed <a href="https://acf.international/media/Changes_from_24.05.2024.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. We would also like to remind you that searching the list has become even more convenient with the <a href="https://sanctions.acf.international/" target="_blank">"Sanctions Tracker"</a> service.

This week's update of the 6000 list reflects the reshuffles that have already taken place in the Russian Government.

Reshuffles in the government and among the security forces

The main additions to the list were the subjects of our big <a href="https://electionfraud2021.acf.international/en/">report</a> on the development and implementation of the e-voting system in Moscow. They deliberately created a tool that is used by the authorities for direct election fraud in the largest region of the country and is completely non-transparent for public control.&nbsp;

We have also included in the list those involved in our investigation into the corruption of Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova, officials from the Presidential Administration and directors of airlines that assist the Ministry of Defense in sending Russian citizens to the war in Ukraine.&nbsp; We have also made multiple technical edits to keep the List up to date.

All changes made can be viewed <a href="https://acf.international/acf-media/Changes_from_21.10.2022_lMic2s1.pdf">here</a>. Feel free to send your motivated suggestions for expanding the lists or removing certain individuals from them to <a href="mailto:info@acf.international">info@acf.international</a> - we consider all letters, but especially welcome those with supporting materials and links to external sources.

&nbsp;

The main additions to the list were the subjects of our big <a href="https://electionfraud2021.acf.international/en/" target="_blank">report</a> on the development and implementation of the e-voting system in Moscow. They deliberately created a tool that is used by the authorities for direct election fraud in the largest region of the country and is completely non-transparent for public control.

We have also included in the list those involved in our investigation into the corruption of Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova, officials from the Presidential Administration and directors of airlines that assist the Ministry of Defense in sending Russian citizens to the war in Ukraine.  We have also made multiple technical edits to keep the List up to date.

All changes made can be viewed <a href="https://acf.international/acf-media/Changes_from_21.10.2022_lMic2s1.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. Feel free to send your motivated suggestions for expanding the lists or removing certain individuals from them to <a href="mailto:info@acf.international" target="_blank">info@acf.international</a> - we consider all letters, but especially welcome those with supporting materials and links to external sources.

The main additions to the list were the subjects of our big report on the development and implementation of the e-voting system in Moscow.

Update to the ACF 6,000 List

October 21, 2022

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