The ACF developed and submitted recommendations to the Australian Parliament on how to improve the country&rsquo;s sanctions legislation. The Parliament <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Sanctions47">requested</a> such proposals as part of its own research.

Australia plays a crucial role in international politics as a major nation defending the values of the free world and as a member of the Commonwealth. The sanctions Australia imposes often pave the way for similar measures in other countries, like the United Kingdom and Canada.

In our recommendations to Australia, we focused on the aspect of sanctions we know best&mdash;targeted sanctions against enablers of corrupt authoritarian regimes, such as Vladimir Putin&rsquo;s regime. The nature of authoritarianism is strikingly similar worldwide, and the methods of combating it are universally applicable.

We propose that sanctions be imposed on individuals based on their roles within these regimes. Taking on a position within a regime should automatically trigger sanctions. If you choose to work for such a regime, you need to know that this decision will close off much of the world&mdash;and access to your ill-gotten gains. This approach sends a clear message to anyone considering working for these regimes: you are complicit in crimes, and the consequences are inevitable. At the same time, this method simplifies the enforcement and management of sanctions.

We also recommend imposing sanctions for &quot;serious corruption&quot; (a term already used in Australian law) against oligarchs and elites within authoritarian regimes. Corruption is the foundation and a key tool for solidifying these regimes. In such systems, corruption is a reward for loyalty among the elites. Sanctions against corrupt individuals, therefore, strike at the heart of these regimes. After all, corrupt wealth loses its luster when it can&rsquo;t be moved to places where the rule of law protects property and guarantees human rights.

Finally, we propose requiring sanctioned individuals to declare their assets. Those who comply would face the current consequences: their funds and property would be frozen until the sanctions are lifted. However, those who hide their assets could face fines equal to the value of the concealed property, effectively leading to asset confiscation. This would make hiding assets less appealing, reduce disputes over ownership, and create strong incentives to uncover hidden assets.

We hope that if our proposals are adopted, they will help exert more effective pressure on authoritarian regimes around the world.

The ACF developed and submitted recommendations to the Australian Parliament on how to improve the country’s sanctions legislation. The Parliament <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Sanctions47" target="_blank">requested</a> such proposals as part of its own research.

Australia plays a crucial role in international politics as a major nation defending the values of the free world and as a member of the Commonwealth. The sanctions Australia imposes often pave the way for similar measures in other countries, like the United Kingdom and Canada.

In our recommendations to Australia, we focused on the aspect of sanctions we know best—targeted sanctions against enablers of corrupt authoritarian regimes, such as Vladimir Putin’s regime. The nature of authoritarianism is strikingly similar worldwide, and the methods of combating it are universally applicable.

We propose that sanctions be imposed on individuals based on their roles within these regimes. Taking on a position within a regime should automatically trigger sanctions. If you choose to work for such a regime, you need to know that this decision will close off much of the world—and access to your ill-gotten gains. This approach sends a clear message to anyone considering working for these regimes: you are complicit in crimes, and the consequences are inevitable. At the same time, this method simplifies the enforcement and management of sanctions.

We also recommend imposing sanctions for "serious corruption" (a term already used in Australian law) against oligarchs and elites within authoritarian regimes. Corruption is the foundation and a key tool for solidifying these regimes. In such systems, corruption is a reward for loyalty among the elites. Sanctions against corrupt individuals, therefore, strike at the heart of these regimes. After all, corrupt wealth loses its luster when it can’t be moved to places where the rule of law protects property and guarantees human rights.

Finally, we propose requiring sanctioned individuals to declare their assets. Those who comply would face the current consequences: their funds and property would be frozen until the sanctions are lifted. However, those who hide their assets could face fines equal to the value of the concealed property, effectively leading to asset confiscation. This would make hiding assets less appealing, reduce disputes over ownership, and create strong incentives to uncover hidden assets.

We hope that if our proposals are adopted, they will help exert more effective pressure on authoritarian regimes around the world.

Our focus was on the type of sanctions we know best—targeted sanctions against those who support corrupt authoritarian regimes.

The Anti-Corruption Foundation Has Submitted Proposals to the Australian Parliament Regarding Sanctions Policy

Dear Mrs. Fajon, dear ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for inviting me to speak at the Bled Strategic Forum and for the award you have chosen to give me. It is a great honor. But even more importantly, it is a fantastic opportunity to address such a distinguished audience&mdash;a great chance to deliver my speech to a large group of people who are at the heart of strategic decision-making.

The events of the last few years have been unfolding at an alarming pace, and the world around us is changing so rapidly that you are constantly having to make numerous tactical decisions. You are here in this hall because you excel at this; you are the best in your countries at handling these challenges. Your voters have entrusted you with managing the never-ending challenges of today&rsquo;s world: wars, epidemics, climate issues, the economy, and migration.

However, I would like to talk not about tactics, but about strategy&mdash;especially since we are gathered here today at a strategic forum. And, of course, as a politician and a citizen of Russia, I want to talk about Russia.

Alexei, my husband, who was killed by Putin six months ago, often used to say, &quot;Never lose sight of the bigger picture.&quot; He had a unique ability to see the bigger picture, to create a vision for the future many years ahead, and to present it in a way that was understandable to everyone, inspiring others with this idea. Thus, his vision of &quot;The Beautiful Russia of the Future&quot; was born&mdash;a democratic, peaceful, European country that will, without doubt, succeed Putin&#39;s regime.

But how do we get to this future? Where will it come from? I&rsquo;d like to ask you a simple question: What is the European Union&#39;s strategy for Russia? Not its current set of measures&mdash;sanctions, restrictions, regulations, etc.&mdash;but its strategy. How does it sound? Is it short, clear, and future-oriented? Can it be defined in three or four sentences? It seems to me that such a strategy does not currently exist. I believe this is a major problem.

There is a certain line of action, for example, regarding the imposition of sanctions. Governments of different countries impose various sanctions on Russia&mdash;both personal and sectoral, as well as against ordinary citizens. At the same time, no one has a clear understanding of why they are being imposed, what their ultimate goal is, or how they affect the speed at which Putin&rsquo;s regime will collapse. Indeed, how can anyone understand this if there is no big picture to measure it against? Without a strategy, it&rsquo;s impossible to make sensible tactical decisions. A strategy provides the framework needed to evaluate the effectiveness of each current decision.

For example, consider Europe&rsquo;s commitment to green energy. This strategic decision was made quite some time ago. Obviously, there are tactical disagreements among the 27 countries, which is perfectly normal and unavoidable. However, despite these disagreements, no one questions the fundamental principles of the strategy. No one suggests demolishing all the wind turbines and returning to coal and fuel oil. European countries are each pursuing green energy at their own pace and in their own way, but they are all moving in the same direction within the framework of the overall strategy.

So, what about the debates on Russia? We can easily find those who openly argue that we should give Putin everything he wants, make peace on his terms, and return to &quot;business as usual,&quot; including buying oil and gas. However, no one can explain why Putin would stand by any agreements or what to do when he ignores them and resumes the war after taking a break.

We can also easily find those who claim that all Russians truly support Putin. But they can&rsquo;t explain why the number of political prisoners in Russia is rising daily or why the number of Russian emigrants abroad continues to increase. And none of them talk about how to support those Russians who oppose the war or how to win over the doubters.

Finally, there are those who advocate for the urgent &quot;decolonization&quot; of Russia, arguing to split our vast country into several smaller, safer states. However, these &ldquo;decolonizers&rdquo; can&rsquo;t explain why people with shared backgrounds and culture should be artificially divided. Nor do they say how this process should even take place.

We see a wide range of opinions, but we don&rsquo;t see a strategy. Of course, it&#39;s very difficult to reach a compromise from such diverse positions. But reaching a compromise is the job of politicians.

No matter what Europe&#39;s future holds, Russia will be part of it. No matter what Russia&#39;s future holds, it will be linked to Europe&#39;s future.&nbsp;

We can&#39;t close our eyes and make Russia disappear&mdash;fortunately. We can&rsquo;t close our eyes and make Putin&rsquo;s regime disappear&mdash;unfortunately. So, we need to develop a plan and follow it accordingly.

And, of course, a strategy for Russia cannot be developed without Russia. It must include the part of Russian civil society that opposes Putin&mdash;Russians who have been working on the basis of democratic, European principles throughout Putin&#39;s rule. Russians who protest against the war, who fight against Putin&rsquo;s dictatorship, risking their freedom and their lives.

In recent months, I&rsquo;ve had many meetings with a wide range of high-level politicians. At every meeting, I am asked, &quot;How can we help?&quot; Well, here&rsquo;s my answer: Let&#39;s work together to develop a strategy and start implementing it.

If you ask me how it might sound, here is my answer: Russia can and should become a democratic European country within its internationally recognized borders. This won&#39;t happen while power is usurped by Putin and his criminal regime. So, together with Russian civil society, we will fight to remove this obstacle to peace and freedom.

Sounds simple, doesn&rsquo;t it? Well, a strategy shouldn&rsquo;t sound complicated. It should be clear. It should provide clarity on what to do and what not to do:

&mdash; Support Russian civil society, Russian independent media, Russian human rights defenders, and any Russian horizontal structures? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

&mdash; Support those who promote hatred of Russians? No, that doesn&rsquo;t align with the strategy.

&mdash; Make a distinction between Putin and Russia? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

&mdash; Negotiate with Putin as if he were a legitimate, democratically elected president of Russia? No, that doesn&rsquo;t align with the strategy.

&mdash; Support Ukraine in exercising its right to defend itself? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

&mdash; Threaten to divide Russia into many parts, playing into the hands of Putin&#39;s propaganda? No, that doesn&rsquo;t align with the strategy.

We need to find a compromise on an important issue: What kind of Russia do we want to see after Putin? Once we agree on this, it will be easier to make tactical decisions. Each decision will be more effective, and the future we are working towards will arrive much sooner.

Let&rsquo;s do this together.

Thank you!

&nbsp;

Dear Mrs. Fajon, dear ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for inviting me to speak at the Bled Strategic Forum and for the award you have chosen to give me. It is a great honor. But even more importantly, it is a fantastic opportunity to address such a distinguished audience—a great chance to deliver my speech to a large group of people who are at the heart of strategic decision-making.

The events of the last few years have been unfolding at an alarming pace, and the world around us is changing so rapidly that you are constantly having to make numerous tactical decisions. You are here in this hall because you excel at this; you are the best in your countries at handling these challenges. Your voters have entrusted you with managing the never-ending challenges of today’s world: wars, epidemics, climate issues, the economy, and migration.

However, I would like to talk not about tactics, but about strategy—especially since we are gathered here today at a strategic forum. And, of course, as a politician and a citizen of Russia, I want to talk about Russia.

Alexei, my husband, who was killed by Putin six months ago, often used to say, "Never lose sight of the bigger picture." He had a unique ability to see the bigger picture, to create a vision for the future many years ahead, and to present it in a way that was understandable to everyone, inspiring others with this idea. Thus, his vision of "The Beautiful Russia of the Future" was born—a democratic, peaceful, European country that will, without doubt, succeed Putin's regime.

But how do we get to this future? Where will it come from? I’d like to ask you a simple question: What is the European Union's strategy for Russia? Not its current set of measures—sanctions, restrictions, regulations, etc.—but its strategy. How does it sound? Is it short, clear, and future-oriented? Can it be defined in three or four sentences? It seems to me that such a strategy does not currently exist. I believe this is a major problem.

There is a certain line of action, for example, regarding the imposition of sanctions. Governments of different countries impose various sanctions on Russia—both personal and sectoral, as well as against ordinary citizens. At the same time, no one has a clear understanding of why they are being imposed, what their ultimate goal is, or how they affect the speed at which Putin’s regime will collapse. Indeed, how can anyone understand this if there is no big picture to measure it against? Without a strategy, it’s impossible to make sensible tactical decisions. A strategy provides the framework needed to evaluate the effectiveness of each current decision.

For example, consider Europe’s commitment to green energy. This strategic decision was made quite some time ago. Obviously, there are tactical disagreements among the 27 countries, which is perfectly normal and unavoidable. However, despite these disagreements, no one questions the fundamental principles of the strategy. No one suggests demolishing all the wind turbines and returning to coal and fuel oil. European countries are each pursuing green energy at their own pace and in their own way, but they are all moving in the same direction within the framework of the overall strategy.

So, what about the debates on Russia? We can easily find those who openly argue that we should give Putin everything he wants, make peace on his terms, and return to "business as usual," including buying oil and gas. However, no one can explain why Putin would stand by any agreements or what to do when he ignores them and resumes the war after taking a break.

We can also easily find those who claim that all Russians truly support Putin. But they can’t explain why the number of political prisoners in Russia is rising daily or why the number of Russian emigrants abroad continues to increase. And none of them talk about how to support those Russians who oppose the war or how to win over the doubters.

Finally, there are those who advocate for the urgent "decolonization" of Russia, arguing to split our vast country into several smaller, safer states. However, these “decolonizers” can’t explain why people with shared backgrounds and culture should be artificially divided. Nor do they say how this process should even take place.

We see a wide range of opinions, but we don’t see a strategy. Of course, it's very difficult to reach a compromise from such diverse positions. But reaching a compromise is the job of politicians.

No matter what Europe's future holds, Russia will be part of it. No matter what Russia's future holds, it will be linked to Europe's future. 

We can't close our eyes and make Russia disappear—fortunately. We can’t close our eyes and make Putin’s regime disappear—unfortunately. So, we need to develop a plan and follow it accordingly.

And, of course, a strategy for Russia cannot be developed without Russia. It must include the part of Russian civil society that opposes Putin—Russians who have been working on the basis of democratic, European principles throughout Putin's rule. Russians who protest against the war, who fight against Putin’s dictatorship, risking their freedom and their lives.

In recent months, I’ve had many meetings with a wide range of high-level politicians. At every meeting, I am asked, "How can we help?" Well, here’s my answer: Let's work together to develop a strategy and start implementing it.

If you ask me how it might sound, here is my answer: Russia can and should become a democratic European country within its internationally recognized borders. This won't happen while power is usurped by Putin and his criminal regime. So, together with Russian civil society, we will fight to remove this obstacle to peace and freedom.

Sounds simple, doesn’t it? Well, a strategy shouldn’t sound complicated. It should be clear. It should provide clarity on what to do and what not to do:

— Support Russian civil society, Russian independent media, Russian human rights defenders, and any Russian horizontal structures? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

— Support those who promote hatred of Russians? No, that doesn’t align with the strategy.

— Make a distinction between Putin and Russia? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

— Negotiate with Putin as if he were a legitimate, democratically elected president of Russia? No, that doesn’t align with the strategy.

— Support Ukraine in exercising its right to defend itself? Yes, that aligns with the strategy.

— Threaten to divide Russia into many parts, playing into the hands of Putin's propaganda? No, that doesn’t align with the strategy.

We need to find a compromise on an important issue: What kind of Russia do we want to see after Putin? Once we agree on this, it will be easier to make tactical decisions. Each decision will be more effective, and the future we are working towards will arrive much sooner.

Navalnaya called on European countries to develop a unified strategy to oppose Putin and his regime.

Yulia Navalnaya delivered a speech at a strategic forum in Slovenia

The Anti-Corruption Foundation has prepared lists of individuals who should be sanctioned in response to the murder of Alexei Navalny. These &quot;Navalny Lists 50&quot; have been sent to the U.S. Department of State, the UK Foreign Office, and relevant ministries in several European countries.

The lists include the names of those valuable to Vladimir Putin and essential to his criminal regime. Sanctions against them will pay tribute to Alexei Navalny&#39;s fight against the corruption that gave rise to this regime.

We have included three categories in the lists: people from Vladimir Putin&#39;s closest circle, whose fate concerns the dictator, such as his relatives and asset holders; oligarchs who ensure a luxurious lifestyle for Putin&#39;s closest associates; and subjects of Alexei Navalny&#39;s anti-corruption investigations.

All of these individuals are crucial parts of Putin&#39;s regime, and imposing sanctions on them will pay tribute to Russia&#39;s foremost anti-corruption fighter.

<a href="https://acf.international/materials">Here</a> you can view the lists for the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

And <a href="https://acf.international/media/Letter_in_support_of_Navalny_List_50.pdf">here</a> is a template that you can send to your country&#39;s foreign ministry and national or European parliament members. Mass citizen appeals will expedite the review of the lists.

&nbsp;

The Anti-Corruption Foundation has prepared lists of individuals who should be sanctioned in response to the murder of Alexei Navalny. These "Navalny Lists 50" have been sent to the U.S. Department of State, the UK Foreign Office, and relevant ministries in several European countries.

The lists include the names of those valuable to Vladimir Putin and essential to his criminal regime. Sanctions against them will pay tribute to Alexei Navalny's fight against the corruption that gave rise to this regime.

We have included three categories in the lists: people from Vladimir Putin's closest circle, whose fate concerns the dictator, such as his relatives and asset holders; oligarchs who ensure a luxurious lifestyle for Putin's closest associates; and subjects of Alexei Navalny's anti-corruption investigations.

All of these individuals are crucial parts of Putin's regime, and imposing sanctions on them will pay tribute to Russia's foremost anti-corruption fighter.

<a href="https://acf.international/materials" target="_blank">Here</a> you can view the lists for the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

And <a href="https://acf.international/media/Letter_in_support_of_Navalny_List_50.pdf" target="_blank">here</a> is a template that you can send to your country's foreign ministry and national or European parliament members. Mass citizen appeals will expedite the review of the lists.

We demand that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union impose sanctions on Putin's inner circle, oligarchs, and corrupt officials in response to the murder of Alexei Navalny.

Sanctions Response to the Murder of Alexei Navalny

This week&#39;s update of the 6000 list reflects the reshuffles that have already taken place in the Russian Government. This has entailed resignations among governors, some of whom have moved to new positions at the federal level. Their places as heads of regions have been taken by new people.&nbsp;

The update also reflects changes in the structures of the Ministry of Defence. Several more high-ranking military commanders have left their posts due to the ongoing arrests on corruption charges of the subjects of our investigations and other officials. In addition, we have updated data on the regional heads of the security agencies that guard the regime: Investigative Committee officials, prosecutors, and the heads of regional FSB and Rosgvardia directorates.

If you have information about inaccuracies in our &lsquo;6000 list&rsquo; or believe someone is or is not included there in error, email us at <a href="mailto:info@acf.international">info@acf.international</a>.

Any changes that have been made to the 6,000 List since the last update can be viewed <a href="https://acf.international/media/Changes_from_24.05.2024.pdf">here</a>. We would also like to remind you that searching the list has become even more convenient with the <a href="https://sanctions.acf.international/">&quot;Sanctions Tracker&quot;</a> service.

&nbsp;

This week's update of the 6000 list reflects the reshuffles that have already taken place in the Russian Government. This has entailed resignations among governors, some of whom have moved to new positions at the federal level. Their places as heads of regions have been taken by new people. 

The update also reflects changes in the structures of the Ministry of Defence. Several more high-ranking military commanders have left their posts due to the ongoing arrests on corruption charges of the subjects of our investigations and other officials. In addition, we have updated data on the regional heads of the security agencies that guard the regime: Investigative Committee officials, prosecutors, and the heads of regional FSB and Rosgvardia directorates.

If you have information about inaccuracies in our ‘6000 list’ or believe someone is or is not included there in error, email us at <a href="mailto:info@acf.international" target="_blank">info@acf.international</a>.

Any changes that have been made to the 6,000 List since the last update can be viewed <a href="https://acf.international/media/Changes_from_24.05.2024.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. We would also like to remind you that searching the list has become even more convenient with the <a href="https://sanctions.acf.international/" target="_blank">"Sanctions Tracker"</a> service.

This week's update of the 6000 list reflects the reshuffles that have already taken place in the Russian Government.

Reshuffles in the government and among the security forces

This week we finalised our list of Vladimir Putin&#39;s proxies for the 2024 election. It was a lot of work, for the help in which we are grateful to the volunteers of Navalny&#39;s Headquarters. Each of the dictator&#39;s proxies has received an individualised description. In addition, we collected evidence of their many ties to the regime in the present and the past. We plan to continue this work for the Top 200 lists, which contain the names of those who should be sanctioned as a priority.&nbsp; We plan to give each person on these lists a fuller and more personalised description of the grounds for inclusion on the 6000 list. In parallel, we will gather evidence for the imposition of restrictive measures against them and links to open sources of information.

If you have information about inaccuracies in our &lsquo;6000 list&rsquo; or believe someone is or is not included there in error, email us at <a href="mailto:info@acf.international">info@acf.international</a>.

Any changes that have been made to the 6,000 List since the last update can be viewed <a href="https://acf.international/media/Changes_from_10.05.2024.pdf">here</a>. We would also like to remind you that searching the list has become even more convenient with the <a href="https://sanctions.acf.international/">&quot;Sanctions Tracker&quot;</a> service.

&nbsp;

This week we finalised our list of Vladimir Putin's proxies for the 2024 election. It was a lot of work, for the help in which we are grateful to the volunteers of Navalny's Headquarters. Each of the dictator's proxies has received an individualised description. In addition, we collected evidence of their many ties to the regime in the present and the past. We plan to continue this work for the Top 200 lists, which contain the names of those who should be sanctioned as a priority.  We plan to give each person on these lists a fuller and more personalised description of the grounds for inclusion on the 6000 list. In parallel, we will gather evidence for the imposition of restrictive measures against them and links to open sources of information.

Any changes that have been made to the 6,000 List since the last update can be viewed <a href="https://acf.international/media/Changes_from_10.05.2024.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. We would also like to remind you that searching the list has become even more convenient with the <a href="https://sanctions.acf.international/" target="_blank">"Sanctions Tracker"</a> service.

This week we finalised our list of Vladimir Putin's proxies for the 2024 election.

Prioritisation of Top 200 lists

In anticipation of Vladimir Putin&#39;s inauguration, the Anti-Corruption Foundation <a href="https://navalny.com/p/6675/">published</a> videos and photos of the interiors of his palace near Gelendzhik. The hidden camera captured the akvadiskoteka (aqua disco hall), Putin&#39;s private pool, luxurious halls, his office, and a chapel with a real imperial throne.

<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="360" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/TL0dSaqhfVs" width="640"></iframe>

In 2021, the Anti-Corruption Foundation published an investigation about a huge palace built for Putin near Gelendzhik. Around 100 billion rubles were spent on its construction. Putin, of course, denied that the palace belonged to him. And his friend, oligarch Arkady Rotenberg, claimed that it was his building and that he planned to open an apartment hotel there after renovations. The renovation was completed, but there is no hotel.

<img alt="" src="/media/news/2024/05/10/uwanvw.jpg" style="width: 1000px; height: 563px;" />

Videos and building plans clearly show that it&#39;s not a hotel but a private palace. The video, captured by a hidden camera, shows the famous akvadiskoteka, a pool, an outdoor alley with pseudo-antique statues, a Jacuzzi, a massage room, halls with military paintings, elite furniture, and chandeliers. One such chandelier costs 50 million rubles.

<img alt="" src="/media/news/2024/05/10/cukvzx.jpg" style="width: 1000px; height: 597px;" />

The &quot;Project&quot; media <a href="https://www.proekt.media/guide/dvoretz-putina-v-gelendzhike/">published</a> the working documentation of the construction company &quot;Velesstroy,&quot; which reconstructed the palace. The builders practically didn&#39;t change anything in the room plans and only gave them new names. Bedrooms were renamed apartments, the music room and reading room were called the lobby, and the dining room was labeled as a restaurant.

In the original blueprint of &quot;Putin&#39;s palace,&quot; there was a room designated for arcade games. However, it has since been replaced by a chapel housing a triptych featuring icons of the Virgin Mary, Jesus Christ, and Saint Vladimir. Additionally, there&#39;s a pew &mdash; essentially a throne for Putin. Historically, such thrones belonged to kings and were referred to as the royal seat.

<img alt="" src="/media/news/2024/05/10/qpqied.jpg" style="width: 1000px; height: 603px;" />

Funding for the construction and upkeep of the palace continues to come from state-owned companies, disguised as nonexistent services. For instance, &quot;Transneft,&quot; led by Putin&#39;s associate Nikolai Tokarev, leases certain non-residential areas within the palace and annually allocates 660 million rubles for this purpose.

Towards the end of the investigation, attention is drawn to a construction trailer featuring a communal restroom for workers involved in the palace&#39;s construction. There are so many inscriptions on the walls, and one of them says &quot;Alexei, you were right!&quot;

&nbsp;

In anticipation of Vladimir Putin's inauguration, the Anti-Corruption Foundation <a href="https://navalny.com/p/6675/" target="_blank">published</a> videos and photos of the interiors of his palace near Gelendzhik. The hidden camera captured the akvadiskoteka (aqua disco hall), Putin's private pool, luxurious halls, his office, and a chapel with a real imperial throne.

In 2021, the Anti-Corruption Foundation published an investigation about a huge palace built for Putin near Gelendzhik. Around 100 billion rubles were spent on its construction. Putin, of course, denied that the palace belonged to him. And his friend, oligarch Arkady Rotenberg, claimed that it was his building and that he planned to open an apartment hotel there after renovations. The renovation was completed, but there is no hotel.

Videos and building plans clearly show that it's not a hotel but a private palace. The video, captured by a hidden camera, shows the famous akvadiskoteka, a pool, an outdoor alley with pseudo-antique statues, a Jacuzzi, a massage room, halls with military paintings, elite furniture, and chandeliers. One such chandelier costs 50 million rubles.

The "Project" media <a href="https://www.proekt.media/guide/dvoretz-putina-v-gelendzhike/" target="_blank">published</a> the working documentation of the construction company "Velesstroy," which reconstructed the palace. The builders practically didn't change anything in the room plans and only gave them new names. Bedrooms were renamed apartments, the music room and reading room were called the lobby, and the dining room was labeled as a restaurant.

In the original blueprint of "Putin's palace," there was a room designated for arcade games. However, it has since been replaced by a chapel housing a triptych featuring icons of the Virgin Mary, Jesus Christ, and Saint Vladimir. Additionally, there's a pew — essentially a throne for Putin. Historically, such thrones belonged to kings and were referred to as the royal seat.

Funding for the construction and upkeep of the palace continues to come from state-owned companies, disguised as nonexistent services. For instance, "Transneft," led by Putin's associate Nikolai Tokarev, leases certain non-residential areas within the palace and annually allocates 660 million rubles for this purpose.

Towards the end of the investigation, attention is drawn to a construction trailer featuring a communal restroom for workers involved in the palace's construction. There are so many inscriptions on the walls, and one of them says "Alexei, you were right!"

In anticipation of Vladimir Putin's inauguration, the Anti-Corruption Foundation published videos and photos of the interiors of his palace near Gelendzhik.

The Anti-Corruption Foundation has shown what Putin's palace looks like now.

This week&#39;s update provides a more detailed and individualized description of the reasons for inclusion in the 6000 list for some oligarchs, investigation subjects and key regime collaborators. We will continue to adhere to this direction of work in the future.

In addition, we continue to work on enriching the list of Vladimir Putin&rsquo;s proxies with data and plan to complete it by the next update. We have also made some clarifications to keep the 6000 list up to date.

Any changes that have been made to the 6,000 List since the last update can be viewed <a href="https://acf.international/media/Changes_from_26.04.2024.pdf">here</a>. We would also like to remind you that searching the list has become even more convenient with the <a href="https://sanctions.acf.international/">&quot;Sanctions Tracker&quot;</a> service.

&nbsp;

This week's update provides a more detailed and individualized description of the reasons for inclusion in the 6000 list for some oligarchs, investigation subjects and key regime collaborators. We will continue to adhere to this direction of work in the future.

In addition, we continue to work on enriching the list of Vladimir Putin’s proxies with data and plan to complete it by the next update. We have also made some clarifications to keep the 6000 list up to date.

Any changes that have been made to the 6,000 List since the last update can be viewed <a href="https://acf.international/media/Changes_from_26.04.2024.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. We would also like to remind you that searching the list has become even more convenient with the <a href="https://sanctions.acf.international/" target="_blank">"Sanctions Tracker"</a> service.

This week's update provides a more detailed and individualized description of the reasons for inclusion in the 6000 list.

Work on the quality of grounds for inclusion in the 6000 list

Carl Bildt, a well-known European politician and diplomat, joined the <a href="https://acf.international/faces">Advisory board</a>&nbsp;of the Anti-Corruption Foundation.&nbsp;

Carl Bildt is Co-Chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, member of the board of trustees of RAND Corporation, contributing columnist to Washington Post, as well as columnist for Project Syndicate.

He has served as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden. In March 2021, Mr&nbsp; Bildt was appointed WHO Special Envoy for the Access to COVID-19 Tools&nbsp; Accelerator (ACT-Accelerator).&nbsp;&nbsp;

On behalf of the European Union and the UN, Carl Bildt has been involved in conflict resolution in the Balkans. He co-chaired the Dayton peace talks on Bosnia, which ended the civil war in the republic. He was also the first Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General to the region. 
 
We thank Mr. Bildt for the trust that he placed in us. We are certain that his participation in the Advisory board will make the work of the Foundation even more effective and reputable. With Mr. Bildt&#39;s support, we will continue to fight the corrupt regime of Vladimir Putin, who is waging a criminal war in Ukraine and continues to destroy Russia.&nbsp;

&nbsp;

Carl Bildt, a well-known European politician and diplomat, joined the <a href="https://acf.international/faces" target="_blank">Advisory board</a> of the Anti-Corruption Foundation.

Carl Bildt is Co-Chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, member of the board of trustees of RAND Corporation, contributing columnist to Washington Post, as well as columnist for Project Syndicate.

He has served as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden. In March 2021, Mr  Bildt was appointed WHO Special Envoy for the Access to COVID-19 Tools  Accelerator (ACT-Accelerator).  

On behalf of the European Union and the UN, Carl Bildt has been involved in conflict resolution in the Balkans. He co-chaired the Dayton peace talks on Bosnia, which ended the civil war in the republic. He was also the first Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General to the region. 
 
We thank Mr. Bildt for the trust that he placed in us. We are certain that his participation in the Advisory board will make the work of the Foundation even more effective and reputable. With Mr. Bildt's support, we will continue to fight the corrupt regime of Vladimir Putin, who is waging a criminal war in Ukraine and continues to destroy Russia.

Carl Bildt has served as Prime Minister of Sweden and was involved in resolving the Balkan conflict. His experience and authority will help us fight against Vladimir Putin's corrupt regime.

Carl Bildt joins the ACF Advisory board

December 12, 2022

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